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Abstract 
Climate change has rapidly emerged as a major threat to our future. Indeed the increasingly dire 
projections of increasing global average temperatures and escalating extreme weather events 
highlight the existential challenge that climate change presents for humanity. In this editorial 
article we outline how climate change not only presents real, physical threats but also challenges 
the way we conceive of the broader economic, political and social order. We asked ourselves 
(and the contributors to this special issue) how we can imagine alternatives to our current path of 
ever escalating greenhouse gas emissions and economic growth. Through reference to the 
contributions that make up this special issue, we suggest that critically engaging with the concept 
of social, economic and political imaginaries can assist in tackling the conceptual and 
organizational challenges climate change poses. Only by questioning current sanitised and 
market-oriented interpretations of the environment, and embracing the catharsis and loss that 
climate change will bring, can we open up space for new future imaginings. 
 
Keywords: climate change; futures; imaginaries; social imaginary significations. 
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Introduction 
There is something almost surreal in researching and writing about climate change. Every day 
new, more dramatic data, studies and events create the sense that the ground under one’s feet is 
shifting in fundamental, yet inconceivable ways. The taken-for-granted assumptions of our 
weather, climate and ecosystem appear to be changing before our very eyes. When we first 
planned this special issue in 2010, Pakistan had just experienced the worst floods in living 
memory (directly effecting an estimated 20 million people), and Russia the worst heat-wave and 
drought it had ever experienced (resulting in the deaths of an estimated 56,000 people) 
(Trenberth, 2012). By 2011 the US was plunged into the most devastating drought in its history, 
juxtaposed by massive floods along the Mississippi which matched the ‘great floods’ of 1927 
and 1933 (Masters, 2012). On September 16, 2012, Arctic summer sea ice melted to an all-time 
low – so significant a decline that scientists suggest that the Arctic Ocean may be ice-free in only 
a few decades (NSIDC, 2012). In writing this editorial we have been confronted with the 
powerful images of a flooded New York City in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy (Barrett, 
2012) and devastating bushfires during the hottest summer ever recorded in Australia (so hot that 
new colours needed to be found for weather charts to document the record heat) (Steffen, 2013).  
 
Indeed, the increasing sophistication of climate science reinforces the catastrophic implications 
of ‘business as usual’ for a twenty-first century world. Projections of 4-6o Celsius global average 
temperature increases are estimated by the end of the century, with much of this warming locked 
in as early as 2020-2030 (New et al., 2011; The World Bank, 2012). Such scenarios paint an 
‘unimaginable’ vision of large tracts of the Earth rendered uninhabitable, the collapse of global 
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food production, the acidification of the oceans, significant sea-level rise, and storms and 
droughts of growing intensity; a literal hell on earth (Hansen, 2009; Lovelock, 2009). 
 
And yet despite these ecologically material threats, tangible political action remains limited to 
rhetorical flourishes against a background of even greater fossil-fuel exploitation. While 
governments pledge reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and businesses promote 
‘organizational sustainability’ (Lash and Wellington, 2007), global GHG emissions have 
increased to record levels (IEA, 2012). There thus is a clear disconnect between our sensemaking 
of socio-economic activities and the established body of climate change science (Mann, 2012). 
This disconnect is also evident in the social sciences which have largely ignored the issue of 
climate change (Urry, 2011), or emphasised limited adjustments to the economic system through 
policies of ‘mitigation’ and/or ‘adaptation’ (Garnaut, 2008; Stern, 2007). This marginalisation of 
the climate crisis is particularly evident in management and organization studies (Goodall, 2008). 
Despite recent journal special issues (Okereke et al., 2012; Wittneben et al., 2012), the critical 
study of climate change and organizations remains at best a fringe topic within the social 
sciences academy. 
 
The starting point of our call for papers for this special issue was the realisation that climate 
change is largely depicted in popular and political discourse as an environmental or ‘natural’ 
problem that requires ‘rational’ responses based on scientific evidence. As Jasanoff (2010: 235) 
put it, climate change is thus imagined as ‘an impersonal, apolitical, and universal imaginary... 
projected and endorsed by science’ and divorced from ‘subjective, situated and normative 
imaginations of human actors’. Yet, we believe there is a need to view climate change as a social 
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and politically embedded phenomenon, fundamentally linked to patterns of production and 
consumption and the ideological assumptions that underpin the economic system and our 
collective sensemaking processes. Indeed, we argue that climate change reveals how scientific 
knowledge interacts with the social imaginaries that stabilize modern societies. In particular, 
Western liberal democracies (and most developing economies) have embraced the capitalist 
imaginary of unlimited expansion of production and consumption (Castoriadis, 1987). Just as the 
successes contributing to this imaginary have been hailed as political, or even ideological, 
victories (Fukuyama, 1992), so the environmental consequences must also be constructed as 
political as well as ecologically material threats. 
 
How then can we imagine alternatives to our current path? Clearly, the physical impacts of 
climate change, require new forms of ecological sensemaking from all of us (Whiteman and 
Cooper, 2011). As Bill McKibben (2013: xx) frankly states in this issue: ‘...our climate future 
doesn’t require much in the way of “imagining”. It’s already here, written down in black ink’. So 
why are we struggling to respond to the socio-economic and political changes being wrought by 
climate change? In this introductory essay, we outline some possible answers to this very basic 
question and reflect on the challenges such answers pose for social science in general, and 
organization studies in particular. In what follows we will highlight how the different 
contributions to this special issue relate and contribute to our understanding of future imaginings 
and climate change. The thread that pulls all these papers together is the realization that climate 
change presents not only a physical (and ecologically material) threat to our existence but also a 
conceptual challenge to the way in which we imagine that existence. 
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Imaginaries and social imaginary significations 
One of the major reasons for the startling lack of action in responding to anthropogenic climate 
change, we believe, is the limited attention paid to the role of economic (Jessop, 2004), social 
(Gaonkar, 2002; Taylor, 2004) and political (Adams et al., 2012; Bottici, 2011) imaginaries. 
Climate science, however valuable and important it may be, in and by itself lacks the cultural 
reflexivity to examine such imaginaries (Yusoff and Gabrys, 2011). Gaonkar (2002) defines a 
social imaginary as an ‘enabling but not fully explicable symbolic matrix within which people 
imagine and act as world making collective agents’, and Jessop (2009: 344) refers to an 
economic imaginary as ‘the semiotic system that gives meaning and shape to the economic 
field’. As Adams et al. (2012: 5) suggest, a concern with imaginaries points ‘to the centrality, but 
also the indeterminacy, of meaning and signification, on the one hand, and the motivation for 
political action, on the other’. The scholars quoted here to a greater or lesser extent all refer back 
to Castoriadis’s (1987) magnum opus The Imaginary Institution of Society (De Cock, 2013). In 
this book Castoriadis explored how social imaginary significations are central to society as an 
imaginary institution and thus provide a dominant orientation for how we see, understand and act 
in that society. One such important social imaginary signification, for example, is the economic 
notion of progress – that with time, technology and entrepreneurialism we can solve any 
problem.  
 
For Castoriadis (1987) our current social system holds together because for the majority of 
people it succeeds, through a set of social imaginary significations, in gaining their adherence to 
the effective, instituted ways of life of this society. Thus the social imaginary significations 
represented and embodied in technological optimism, corporate environmentalism, carbon 
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markets, and green consumption shape people’s sense of what is permissible, desirable and 
possible. They create and institutionalize a proper and meaningful world. The signification of 
progress simultaneously binds together our diverse activities of production and consumption and 
gives them directions – ‘a drive for the society’ (Castoriadis, 1997: 336). However, these 
imaginary significations are not rational (the continuation of increased GHG emissions would 
dispute any conceptualization of rationality), nor real in a traditional sense (we can, for example, 
not touch or observe ‘progress’, ‘entrepreneurship’ and ‘technology’); they are creations of the 
social imaginary, shared and incorporated by individuals in society. Yet, they determine how we, 
as citizens, define what knowledge and information is, what relevance we give to it, and how we 
to respond to it. Thus, above and beyond the scientific evidence, to respond to climate change 
necessarily means to become engaged in struggles over society’s meaning and significations. 
 
Failing to engage people’s imagination and society’s social imaginary significations, means 
people will simply adhere to ‘the way things are’. No amount of extra scientific information 
about climate change can make an impact on their life planning and political choices if their 
imagination is not engaged, and if our sensemaking abilities are not actively engaged. Indeed, it 
is the power of our current capitalist imaginary that sustains the carbon extracting, distributing, 
and producing industries, resulting in ever increasing GHG emissions. This social imaginary 
with its accompanying rhetoric of long-term economic growth, has monopolized the way that the 
social (and by extension the organizational) is conceived in dominant discourses of climate 
change. As Yusoff and Gabrys (2011: 517) suggest, it imagines ‘humans as either drivers of 
climate change or recipients of its effects, rather than as a heterogeneous and differentiated social 
body with distinct desires, constraints, and imaginations’. This in turn has strengthened a 
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particular set of responses to climate change ‘based on individual calculation, technology and the 
development of new markets’ (Szerszynski and Urry, 2010: 3). Such responses are structured 
around the perceived inevitability of capitalism and a market economy as the basic 
organizational structure of the social and economic order (Newell and Paterson, 2010; 
Swyngedouw, 2010). 
 
Whilst the broader social science literature on climate change generally agrees that dealing with 
the problem of climate change is inevitable, few commentators take seriously Urry’s (2010: 198) 
realization that ‘to slow down, let alone reverse, increasing carbon emissions and temperatures 
requires the reorganization of social life, nothing more and nothing less’, let alone Gilding’s 
(2011) vision of a cathartic and fundamental disruption of our social and economic order (see 
also the interview with Paul Gilding in this issue). Indeed, influential academic commentators 
such as Giddens (2009) and Beck (2009) see climate change as a global humanitarian cause and 
envisage a largely peaceful process of reform in which the business and political elites adapt to 
the requirements of a new sustainable economy within current governance and moral structures. 
Often this kind of literature displays what Leahy et al. (2010: 864) call ‘a kind of “boy scout” 
willingness to tell us how it can all be fixed’. This is perhaps best illustrated through the current 
arguments for geo-engineering solutions to mitigate the consequences of climate change 
(Hamilton, 2013; Klein, 2012). As rational ‘masters of the universe’, humans can stabilize Earth 
systems without major and unintended consequences to the atmosphere, the oceans, or 
biodiversity. 
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Of course social imaginary significations require strategic agency. As a growing literature has 
highlighted, the so-called ‘climate change denial industry’ has been pivotal in delaying and 
constraining regulatory moves to limit GHG emissions (Dunlap and McCright, 2011). Taking 
their lobbying blueprint from the tobacco companies (Oreskes and Conway, 2010), the fossil fuel 
industry has spent considerable money in questioning climate science and seeking to discredit 
climate scientists (Mann, 2012). These are themes that several of the contributors to this special 
issue point to. For example, Lê (2013) in her study of the Athabasca ‘oil sands’, notes how 
resource companies have no intention of halting the expansion of fossil fuel extraction and 
concomitant environmental destruction. Where development is seen as limited or curtailed this 
occurs only where the strategic risks of increased regulation or more profitable alternative 
activities are identified. Similarly, climate scientist Michael Mann (later in this issue) provides a 
telling example of the lengths climate change deniers, and their allies in conservative politics and 
the media, are willing to go to in attacking any challenges to business as usual. As McKibben 
(2012) notes, capturing the public debate and shaping the limits of government regulation is for 
many of these companies cheaper and less threatening to their business models than 
meaningfully responding to the challenges of climate change. Indeed, if we are to have a serious 
chance of limiting global warming to the average 2 degrees Celsius that scientists have argued is 
essential1, this would mean leaving 80% of existing fossil fuel reserves in the ground (Carbon 
Tracker Initiative, 2012) – within capitalist social imaginary significations, this ‘irrationality’ 
makes no sense.2 
 
A more subtle illustration in this special issue of how capitalist social imaginary significations 
are instituted in terms of climate change is provided by Huising et al. (2013). They explore the 
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role of visual imagery in corporate advertising for more ‘climate-friendly’ automobiles and 
through analysis of Toyota Prius car advertisements they show how a utopian, or ‘hyperreal’ 
future is presented as achievable through further consumption. In these advertisements our 
rational mastery over nature is demonstrated through visual imagery where, ‘nature is not wild, 
and it has lost its fractal, non symmetrical patterns, and variations’ (Huising et al., 2013: xx). 
These images re-emphasize a social imaginary in which we can control and tame nature through 
technological innovations, such as hybrid engines and office recycling. Moreover, the ‘solution’ 
to climate change is presented as further consumption, hailing individual choice and brand 
identities for a ‘cleaner and greener’ future. Indeed, corporations in embracing the concepts of 
‘corporate environmentalism and ‘organisational sustainability’ create new subject positions for 
employees and citizens as ethical employees, ecopreneurs, responsible consumers and active 
citizens. Thus citizenship activities become seamlessly embedded in an imaginary, where ‘the 
only solution to the problems of capitalism is more capitalism!’ (Nyberg et al., 2013: xx). 
 
Climate change deniers aside, even if there exists a solid majority among the population who 
believe that climate change is a real threat, what this means politically or organizationally is 
uncertain. Indeed, as the contribution by Levy and Spicer (2013) in this special issue 
demonstrates, different forms of social imagining have emerged in the popular and academic 
discourses surrounding climate change. Building on Jessop’s (2004) concept of ‘economic 
imaginaries’, they identify four specific ‘climate imaginaries’ which they term, ‘fossil fuels 
forever’, ‘climate apocalypse’, ‘techno-market’, and ‘sustainable lifestyle’. Importantly, they 
find that, while newer imaginaries such as the ‘techno-market’ and ‘sustainable lifestyle’ have 
developed a potential to challenge the traditional fossil fuel value regime, the ‘fossil fuel forever’ 
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imaginary has maintained its dominance by best connecting with an existing value regime and 
‘with popular interests and identities, thereby having a broader resonance with people’s everyday 
lives’ (Levy and Spicer, 2013: xx). Their work thus highlights the way in which our future 
imaginings of climate change are tied to existing social discourses and material 
interdependencies in our economic system.  
 
Indeed, as Swyngedouw (2010: 223) points out, the current mainstream response to climate 
change ‘does not invite a transformation of the existing socio-ecological order but calls on the 
elites to undertake action such that nothing really has to change, so that life can basically go on 
as before’. He deplores this ‘thoroughly depoliticized imaginary’ (ibid: 219) which is not 
articulated within any specific political program or particular socio-ecological trajectories. Leahy 
et al.’s (2010: 864) interview and survey data empirically support this view in that they highlight 
‘that people can expect a collapse and yet have no intention to change their conduct to prevent 
it’. No drastic change to current economic arrangements is conceivable or possible. In short, 
climate change seems to exhaust the horizon of our aspirations and imaginations, causing a 
disconnect with our own pasts and futures. 
 
Imaginings and imagination, future and past 
Whilst a historical overview of the notions of imagination and imaginary would take us far 
beyond the scope of this special issue, it is still useful to tease out some important basic features 
we find in the literature. Of course, one notion of the imagination and imagining concerns 
utopian fancies, ‘a dangerous and demobilizing escapism, and forms of collective or subjective 
delusion which perpetuate the status-quo’ (Haiven and Khasnabish, 2010: ii-iii). The history and 
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provenance we are interested in, however, is ‘the ability to imagine the world, social institutions 
and human (and non-human) relationships otherwise’ (ibid.), as a means for emancipation and 
thus critique of what is given, rather than subjection to it. In short, as a source of freedom rather 
than domination (Bottici, 2011). For example, for Sartre ([1940] 2004) the essential feature of 
the imagination is that human beings can imagine the world, or any part of it, being different 
from the way it is. Imagination is therefore inseparable from the notion of freedom: 
For consciousness to be able to imagine, it must be able to escape from the world by 
its very nature, it must be able to stand back from the world by its own efforts. In a 
word, it must be free (Sartre, 1940: 185). 
As such, imagination makes present to our mind what is not in front of us and provides a 
counterweight to the actuality of the world. 
 
A second key function of the imagination is to summon the absent into presence, to produce the 
‘irreal’. As Sartre (1940: 186) elaborates: 
...every concrete and real situation of consciousness in the world is pregnant with the 
imaginary in so far as it is always presented as a surpassing of the real... ... there is 
always and at every moment the concrete possibility for it to produce the irreal... 
In this process something determinate is cancelled, pushed into latency, or derealized in order to 
release the possibilities inherent in the given (Iser, 1993). As the faculty to make present what is 
potentially absent, the imagination is at the very basis of the possibility of action. It can make our 
present waver ‘like the vibrations of a heat wave through which the massiveness of the object 
world - indeed of matter itself - now shimmers like a mirage’ (Jameson, 1999: 38). By being 
mindful of all the other ways the world could be, the imagination always has one foot in the 
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future. Indeed, the capacity to begin something truly new depends on our ability to imagine that 
things might as well be different from what they actually are, or at the very least less solid and 
determinate than they appear to be (Bottici, 2011).  
 
Rancière (2004: 41) picks up on this with his notion of the utopian imaginary as something 
purposefully ‘irreal’, ‘a montage of words and images appropriate for reconfiguring the territory 
of the visible, the thinkable, and the possible’. Only where the imagination is not restrained by a 
concept (given by understanding) or the moral law (given by reason), can it alter our sense of 
what is real and communicable (Arendt, 1993). Too often people forget that our current socio-
economic system came into being because human beings have imagined it, and thus they often 
feel powerless to intervene. Bringing the dimension of imagination to the fore would mean that 
society could begin to explicitly question its own institution and its established social imaginary 
significations. As Castoriadis (1997: 368) puts it: 
…what is accomplished thereby is a shattering of the closure in and through which 
the simple living being is, an (always imperfect and unfinished) unsettling of one’s 
own world as exclusive… a being that explicitly puts into question the laws of its 
own existence and that henceforth is in and through this putting into question 
(emphasis in original). 
Such a move may then create real possibilities for constructing different socio-environmental 
futures. 
 
It is our belief that the particular social imaginary significations associated with a capitalist 
growth machine have facilitated an evacuation of the temporal frame of the near future. Jameson 
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(2002: 214) notes in this respect a thinning out of the sense of the ‘past and future within the 
present’, with the near future itself primarily something in which one can invest in, very much in 
the spirit of stock market futures. Such a neutralized future has become ‘a kind of new actuarial 
colonization of the unknown’ (Jameson, 2005: 228), with the present – ‘our way of life’ – simply 
stretching all the way to infinity, give or take a few new electronic gadgets (think iPhone 7!). 
Yet, such a future deprived of a proper imaginative dimension can offer us no alternatives, no 
ways of productively intervening in our current situation. What we are faced with, as Guyer 
(2007: 416) puts it rather eloquently, are ‘reconfigurations of elements that are well-known 
already, moved in to colonize particular phases and domains of individual and collective life that 
have been released from answerability to a more distant past and future’. Future imaginings, as 
we conceive them, would have to be able to go beyond what is hidden from our current 
perceptive and temporal frame. For such possible futures to be set in motion we would have to 
consider ‘imaginative possibilities to become otherwise’ (Yusoff and Gabrys, 2011: 519). In 
addition, such considerations inevitably involve reflections on social and intergenerational 
justice and morality, with virtual representatives of other generations able to press their claims 
against those of the living (Bull, 2012). 
 
Whilst the theme of our special issue concerns ‘future imaginings’, this does not mean we intend 
to – or indeed can – exclude the past. On the contrary, if we truly want to take seriously the 
notions of individual imagination and social imaginaries we cannot remain beholden to 
traditional conceptions of history with its linear notions of historical accumulation and progress. 
Instead we have to expose and dissipate the illusion of continuity in history and endow the 
present with its abilities to become other than it is (Weber, 2008). In doing so, we follow Walter 
14 
 
Benjamin and Hannah Arendt in their fragmentary historiography; an approach to history that 
enables us to recover the lost potentials of the past in the hope that they may find actualization in 
the present and thus keep open the possibility of what is yet to come. In this special issue, 
Gosling and Case (2013) provide an ideal illustration of the potential for re-appropriating the 
past to ‘see’ the future. They explore the allegorical parallels between the cultural collapse of 
indigenous Americans facing the catastrophe of European colonization and the contemporary 
threat of climate change. Through collective dreaming, a dystopian future was imagined as an 
alternative which arguably assisted in coming to terms with catastrophe where ‘existentially 
significant activities are no longer possible’ (Gosling and Case, 2013: xx). Their article raises the 
question of whether a similar form of collective dreaming might be applied to the current 
unfolding environmental and social catastrophe of climate change. 
 
It is through such a critical reappropriation of the past that we can endow it with relevance and 
meaning for the present, and make it a source of inspiration for the future (De Cock et al., 2013). 
Benjamin (2002) thus suggests a presentation of history that ‘leads the past to bring the present 
into a critical state’ (N7a, 5). By critical state he understands the moment at which history 
emerges from the dream that it is simply an accumulation and record of progress. As he puts it 
pithily, ‘Definitions of basic historical concepts: Catastrophe – to have missed the opportunity. 
Critical moment – the status quo threatens to be preserved’ (Benjamin, 2002: N10, 2). For 
Benjamin the ‘catastrophe’ then is not something awaiting us in the future, but is simply the fact 
that everything goes on, and continues to go on, exactly as it does. It is through some kind of 
rupture in our modern time-consciousness that the past may ‘open up to us with unexpected 
freshness and tell us things no one has yet had ears to hear’ (Arendt, 1993: 94), thus allowing us 
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to grasp our own present moment in terms of a critical situation in which we are able to intervene 
in a way that enables us to reclaim the near future. Arendt (1993: 241) also offers an intriguing 
link between the imagination and intergenerational and inter-geographic justice, as she believes 
that it is precisely the imagination that enables ‘being and thinking in my own identity where 
actually I am not.’ 2 
 
The challenge and possibilities of climate change for studies of organization 
We live in an organizational world where ‘Green’ has become good business, a need to be 
satisfied just like any other human need, and ‘Sustainability’ appears within the confines of 
traditional management textbooks. Indeed, much public discourse echoes this new vocabulary 
(Esty and Winston, 2006; Werbach, 2009). As such, concepts such as ‘Green’ and 
‘Sustainability’ have followed the fate of so many originally powerful critiques of our socio-
economic order, having been assimilated within the value regime of capitalism. This is a 
dynamic that Boltanski and Chiapello (2005: 27) have explored in the dialectic of capitalism and 
its critiques; describing at length capitalism’s extraordinary capacity of absorption, or what 
Latour (2004: 231) described as ‘the famed power of capitalism for recycling everything aimed 
at its destruction’. In relation to climate change for instance, some corporations uphold an 
illusion of compromise between the environment and the market by adapting the meaning of 
concepts such as ‘CSR’ and ‘sustainability’ to fit existing corporate agendas and expand the 
capitalist imaginary. Irrespective of individuals personal concerns about the environment or 
climate change (Wright and Nyberg, 2012; Wright et al., 2012), such corporate 
environmentalism can only occur where such practices generate further profit (Nyberg and 
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Wright, 2012). There is thus limited space to challenge the underlying social imaginary 
significations of economic growth and profitability. 
 
And yet, we believe climate change in its very materiality can offer a genuine challenge for 
organizational scholars which has moral, epistemic and representational dimensions. What is 
peculiar about the organizational challenge of climate change is that its most productive debates 
are concerned with possibilities that are both remote in time and space, and uncertain in 
outcome. It is therefore thanks to climate change that a body of thought is emerging which 
positions everyday actions in direct relation to their most distant consequences, and in the 
process places unprecedented demands on our moral imagination (Bull, 2012). There may exist a 
disconnect between traditional representations of climate change and our modern systems of 
experience and understanding, but climate change also offers possibilities through the 
discordances it produces in established ways of understanding the human condition. It forces us 
to confront a collective psychic predicament: ‘how can we think in a realistic way about 
something whose implications are unthinkable’ (Hoggett, 2011: 264)? As such it temporarily 
burdens the imagination with excess. 
 
Hence, while our encounter with the ensemble of phenomena called ‘climate change’ may tell us 
things we do not wish to know about organizations, sensemaking and the way we organize, it 
may also open up opportunities for the field. Given the current path of escalating GHG emissions 
and with climate change developing faster and with fiercer consequences than predicted, it defies 
our imaginary of rational mastery and linear thinking. In short, nature is biting back (Barad, 
2007). This questions the imaginary significations we cling to, with our continuous failures 
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forcing us to make sense of the world differently (Gilding, 2011; Whiteman and Cooper, 2011; 
Whiteman et al., 2013). While this requires us to file away the effects of climate change in our 
normative economies of representation, it also conversely allows us to make ‘play of the world’ 
and preserve a fidelity to the ecologic materiality of events we are witnessing from afar or 
experiencing first hand. It also means we have to conceptualize climate change as an ethical, 
organizational and material problem that poses new questions and reconfigures established 
socio-economic imaginaries.  
 
Climate change thus puts into question society’s organization, in the broadest and most profound 
sense of the word ‘organization’, shattering in part a certain representational-cognitive closure 
(Castoriadis, 1997). It is not enough that our research simply leads us to an awareness of ‘the 
state of the planet’; it has to produce simultaneously a double effect: ‘the readability of a political 
signification and a sensible or perceptual shock caused… by that which resists signification’ 
(Rancière, 2004: 63). Or as Yusoff (2010: 94) put it more viscerally, ‘[C]limate change must 
force new images full of loss and rage that scream through our aesthetic orders’. In other words, 
we must allow the increasing disruption of the physical (material) experiences of climate change 
to truly disrupt us, and not simply become an accumulation of experience that mimics those that 
are sold in the marketplace; ‘to not look away and to acknowledge with that look both 
responsibility and violence’ (Yusoff, 2010: 89). Rancière (and Yusoff) talk about a 
‘redistribution of the sensible’ in this respect which may open up a ‘generative space of 
unknowing’. In other words: a space for future imaginings.  
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Notes 
1. However, leading climate scientist James Hansen has convincingly argued that this politically 
agreed 2 degree global warming limit, is in itself ‘a prescription for disaster’ (Hansen and 
Sato, 2012: 21). Based on a study of the paleoclimatic records going back 50 million years, he 
and colleagues have demonstrated that CO2 concentrations of 450 ppm (synonymous with 2 
degrees of pre-industrial warming), are sufficient to initiate feedback mechanisms in the 
Earth’s climate such as the thawing of permafrost and resulting methane emissions. 
 
2. However, some business groups have called for a more fundamental reimagining of the 
economic order. For example, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD), have provided more provocative commentaries. As their President, Peter Bakker 
(2012), recently argued: ‘In Vision 2050 we firmly believe that business can be the major 
provider of solutions for this multi-facetted crisis we face. But let me be very clear, this 
vision cannot be reached by mere incremental change, it requires a radical transformation 
of everything: demand, production, and the measures of success.’ (emphasis in original). 
 
2. It is of interest we believe to put the quote in its context: ‘I form an opinion by considering a 
given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those 
who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt 
the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a 
different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel 
like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in 
my own identity where actually I am not’ (Arendt, 1993: 241). 
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